This research aims to understand the extent to which generation and social class determine Turkish respondents' level of political activism. It tests macroeconomic socialization effect and social class effect on political activism as hypothesized by Ronald Inglehart and S. Martin Lipset respectively. It also strives to understand whether macropolitical period effect, suggested by P. Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, has also some generational implications for political activism. Further to these examinations, as an original contribution, it raises a generational challenge to Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis -within the particular area of political activismfor those generations which came of age under authoritarian politico-juridical order and also for those which did not.
INTRODUCTION
The Gezi Protests (GP) put Turkey in the limelight of political activism research. The GP, which took place in the summer of 2013, sparked as a resistance against the Turkish government's decision to reconstruct historical military barracks in the Taksim Gezi Park. In the beginning, a small number of environmentalists engaged in the protests, but the police's severe suppression of the first wave of protests through the use of tear gas and water cannons transformed the protests into a nationwide movement.
The present research aims to investigate the role of generational and social class locations for understanding political activism and social change in Turkey. With this purpose in mind, it generates hypotheses derived from specific elements of Inglehart's post-materialist thesis, Beck and Jennings' thesis linking political periods and political activism and Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis. In addition to testing these hypotheses, it raises its original hypothesis by combining the two previous ones and suggest that the extent to which system-level authoritarianism experienced in the formative years determines the social class effect on political activism. This way it aims to explain Karl Mannheim's argument on the transformation of "generation as location" into "generation as actuality".
Turkey provides an unprecedented test case to investigate both inter-generational and interclass attitudinal differences. Young and dynamic population, developing economy, economic and social inequalities produced by the fierce application of the market economy model, inefficient redistribution policies, and intermittent political history are expected to produce large differences across generation and class categories. Another important factor underlying Turkey's selection is, as preliminary analyses showed, its citizens' low level of political activism, which is a dire news for Turkish democracy. However, it should be noted that, despite it takes the form of a case-study of Turkey, the models sketched in the analysis are generalizable for all societies experiencing similar conditions. Developing countries with high tempo of long-term socioeconomic development and unstable political histories would be fruitful locations for replication studies testing generalizable conditions. Alternatively, the models that were sketched in this research can be applied cross-culturally within a comparative setting. Nonetheless, neither a research on other countries other than Turkey nor a comparative research were preferred since periodization of generations and interpreting the results adequately requires profound knowledge about the political history of the country that is being researched.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section extant literature on political participation is reviewed briefly. Following the literature review, data and methodology are introduced. Subsequently, the results of the analysis are presented. Finally, wider implications of the findings are further elaborated.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
By looking at declining levels of electoral turnout and party membership since 1970s, a group of scholars has warned that political participation was in decline in the industrialized countries of the West. 1 This was a serious caveat because if that was the case, it could result in a crisis of democracy in the near future. However, another group of scholars has challenged this view and argued that, rather than declining, political activism was in fact on the rise when unconventional repertoires of political activism were taken into account. Ronald Inglehart was a strong supporter of the latter view. Basing his theory on Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory, Inglehart has described a shift from materialist to post-materialist needs in post-war Europe. According to Inglehart's post-materialist theory, perhaps the most popular theorizing of the impact of secular changes in post-war Europe, individuals who were already born into physical and economic security environment in the post-war period did not need to struggle for their physical and material needs. Instead, enjoying these securities from birth, those individuals seek a higher set of needs, including need for self-esteem and self-actualization as well as intellectual and aesthetic needs. Eventually, by means of a generational replacement mechanism, those individuals with post-materialist needs were understood to have become the majority in the 1970s, paving the way for a sociological transformation in Western European advanced industrial societies, which was labelled by Inglehart as "the silent revolution". Inglehart has argued that a post-materialist shift in needs had implications for the political activism sphere too. According to Inglehart, rising levels of physical and human capital undermined the conventional forms of political activism and introduced new avenues for participating in politics. More elitechallenging, flexible, and direct forms of political action substituted conventional forms since the latter had substantially lost their ability to cater to the needs of a new post-materialist generation. 2 Looking at the Turkish case from Inglehart's perspective, we can draw an analogy between the periods of economic development in the post-war Western Europe and in the post-1980 Turkey. Making such analogy is important because a participatory Turkish generation that was socialized during this period, if any, may breathe fresh life into Turkish democracy, as did the post-war youth in Western Europe. During the period ranged between 1980s and 2010s, which corresponds to the term in which most of the GP participants have spent their formative years, by the beginning of liberalization of the market, the Turkish economy grew by an average of about five percent and the GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) quadrupled. The share of the middle class increased from 18 to 41 percent between 1993 and 2010. Turkey signed the Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995, which increased the Turkish export to the European region by about twenty times.
3 By looking at this picture, we hypothesize in line with Inglehart's post-materialist theory that the members of the generation which have enjoyed relatively affluent economic conditions of the post-1980 Turkey during their formative years are more likely to develop an activity-prone characteristic than the members of the preceding generations (Hypothesis I).
Alternative to the idea of macroeconomic socialization enshrined in the post-materialist thesis and linking greater affluence at the time of socialization to increased political activism, particularly through unconventional channels amongst the new generations, another group of researchers has focussed on the role of macropolitical period factors to understand changes in the levels of political action. The period ranging from the late 1960s to the early 1970s in the US has particularly drawn their attention in this regard. Beck and Jennings, after investigating data from the 1965 -1973 Socialization Panel Study and the 1956 -1976 Michigan presidential election series, have concluded that the American youth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which they have recognized as "a deviant period", constituted a particular generation with respect to their level of political action. The youth of this "turbulent" period, being influenced by some remarkable political events, including anti-Vietnam War protests, the Civil Rights Movement and the censorship of McCarthyism, developed a more activity-prone profile than their parental generation, their predecessor and successor filial generations. Rejecting the previous theories of political participation that were based on a curvilinear relationship between age and political activism, which had long served as a guideline to understand the patterns of American political activism, Beck and Jennings have concluded that there is no constant relationship between age and participation. Thus, to "handle 'deviance' as well as 'normality'" in the relationship between the two, Beck and Jennings have advised "adding an explicit political factor, the opportunities for involvement, into the participation equation." 4 As described in the above lines, when the development of macroeconomic condition is considered, post-1980 Turkey and post-war Western Europe show some similarities. However, they diverge significantly when macropolitical circumstances are taken into account. Unlike the situation in the post-war Western Europe in which socioeconomic development was accompanied by democratization movements and enhancement of civil rights and freedoms, in the post-1980 Turkey, macroeconomic development was accompanied by military and civil authoritarian governments aiming to re-establishing state authority and security environment at the expense of violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. Following the 1980 military coup, individual economic, social and political rights that were introduced in the 1962 constitution were largely suspended. The executive power was further strengthened. The council of ministers was authorized to pass a decree law.
5 Executive authority over universities was consolidated. The Higher Education Council (YÖK) was established as a supreme authority over the higher education.
6 Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) was established to control radios and television channels. 7 State security courts, the members of which were assigned by the executive authority, were effectively used to suppress political opposition.
8 The anti-terror law was adopted in 1991, which occasionally made way for the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of the civilians while fighting against the PKK terrorism especially in the Eastern rural zones. Departing from this point of view, in order to investigate to what extent macropolitical period effect has generational implications for political activism, a hypothesis, which is an alternative to the one that was derived from Inglehart's post-materialist thesis, is derived from Beck and Jennings' thesis. It should also be noted that while developing this hypothesis, we made a distinction between three political periods in 20 th century Turkish political history by looking at the administrative practices introduced by the incumbent governments and the legal system in power and labelled each of them either as authoritarian or non-authoritarian. 9 This way we aimed to take "opportunities for involvement" into account as suggested by Beck and Jennings. Thus, we hypothesize that the members of the post-1980 generation are less likely to develop an activity-prone characteristics than the members of the previous generation owing to their exposition to authoritarian system-level socialization during their formative years (Hypothesis II).
So far, we have discussed only the direct generation-political activism relationship. However, it is likely that the generational effect on political activism is mediated by the social class, given the extremely large differences between the living conditions of social classes in Turkey. This thinking implies a potential indirect generational effect on political activism, which presumably operates via the social class structure. To understand this indirect effect, if any, we first need to understand the social class effect on political activism. With this purpose in mind, we will exploited Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis. The working class authoritarianism thesis is a well-respected theorising of the class-attitudes relationship in modern societies. In his seminal 1959 work, Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism, Lipset has raised perhaps one of the clearest arguments concerning the relationship between social class structure and authoritarian propensities. Lipset has argued that the working class was the most pro-democratic social segment of the society before 1914. The working class leftwing parties were strong supporters of civil rights and freedoms, democracy and peace while the middle class ones resisted against the suffrage movements, promoted nationalistic policies and allied with traditional powers such as the church. However, since 1914 the working class had become the most authoritarian segment in many countries of the world. Lipset has noted that single-party system preference, political extremism, intolerance against minority groups, intransigence, punitive child-rearing patterns and low participation in politics are but some working class conditions which are largely underlined by factors including, low educational attainment, income insecurity, isolated group existence and lack of sophistication. 10 Hereby, departing from Lipset's viewpoint on the relationship between social class and participation in politics, we hypothesize that the Turkish working class respondents are less likely to develop an activity-prone characteristic than their middle class counterparts and this can largely be explained by the former group's low education and income (Hypothesis III).
Having clarified the relationship between the class structure and political activism, next we need to test this relationship across generations. We developed our fourth and final hypothesis, arguing that macropolitical effect has generational implications which determines the individual-level social class effect on political activism, to explain Karl Mannheim's argument on the transformation of "generation as location" into "generation as actuality". Mannheim laid down the foundations of his theory of generations in his 1927 essay, The Problem of Generations. His essay can be considered as a part of his sociology of knowledge studies. In this essay, reflecting his relationist perspective, Mannheim upheld Wilhelm Pinder's view, suggesting that the combined effects of constant and transient factors produce the historical progress. Thus, according to Mannheim, the knowledge about existence can only be achieved by considering spatial and temporal factors together. Within this context, Mannheim has argued that contemporaneity can not be the only factor playing a role in the formation of generations. Instead, it has to be accompanied by exposure to the same historical and social environment. Moreover, basing his theory on the theories of the development of the human mind, Mannheim has argued that this exposure takes place during the early phases of human life, because at this early period human beings are highly susceptible to the formative forces of life. Values that were acquired during this period occupy such an important place in one's value system that they play significant roles in shaping one's future attitudes and behaviour in a predicted way and this paves the way for the formation of generations. Mannheim has depicted the generation phenomenon as a combination of three imaginary concentric circles, generation as location (generationslagerung), generation as actuality (generationszusammenhang) and generation unit (generationseinheiten). In this representation, generation as location corresponds to the largest outmost circle which sets the widest criterion of a generation. The first inner-circle symbolizing generation as actuality surrounds the second inner-circle symbolizing generation unit. According to Mannheim moving from the outmost circle to the innermost one increases attitudinal homogeneity. However, Mannheim has argued that generation as location transforms into generation as actuality in some particular circumstances. According to Mannheim, social classes may blend in with one another as a result of being socialized by extraordinary time such as a war and this is what happened to German classes during the wars against Napoleon.
11 Keeping in mind our two previously set hypothesis generated to investigate the generational implications of macropolitical period effect and social class effect on political activism (Hypotheses II and III) as well as Mannheim's above argument on the transformation of generation as location into generation as actuality a result of being exposed to major scale political events, we argue that Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis cannot be applied to the generation which was socialized during the post-1980 period due to its members' exposure to system-level authoritarianism during the age they came of age. Instead, raising a generational challenge to Lipset's thesis, we hypothesize that for the members of the post-1980 generation, social classes were equalized with respect to their likelihood of participating in politics owing to system-level authoritarianism they have faced during their formative years (Hypothesis IV).
DATA AND METHODS
World Values Survey (WVS) data for Turkey were recruited for the analyses of this research. The survey is administered by the World Values Survey Association (WVSA), which is a global network of social scientists. The Turkish survey began in 1990 and continued through 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2011 . Five waves of the survey were conducted through face-to-face interviews with respondents aged 18 and over. 12 The selection of the WVS is underlined by the fact that it is the only available data set for Turkey, involving all the variables of interest. Due to the lack of panel data, five waves of cross-sectional WVS data for Turkey, spanning over twenty years, accomplished our aim to treat the notorious age/period/cohort (APC) identification problem. After removing cases with "no answer" and "don't know" responses for any of the variables of interest, a multistage representative sample of the Turkish population, consisting of 6257 cases, is obtained. Construction of the dependent and the two key independent variables are presented below. 13 
Variables Dependent Variables
Our dependent variable is based on a survey item asking the respondents to self-report their participation in politics. The question reads as follows: "Now here are some forms of political action that people can take. Please indicate, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it." Three forms of political action were given repeatedly to the respondents across all the five subsequent waves of the Turkish survey. They are: "signing a petition", "joining in boycotts", and "attending lawful demonstrations". These three unconventional repertoires of action constitute the three dependent variables of the current investigation. While constructing the dependent variables, we dummycoded the answers. We assigned "1" for actual participation and "0" for non-participation.
Independent Variables Generation
In order to analyse a potential generational divide in Turkish political activism, generation was employed as the first key independent variable. The generation variable was basically derived from the WVS question asking the respondents' birth years. The following procedure was adopted while generating the variable. First, the 1960 and the 1980 military coups were pinpointed as two major politico-historical events in the 20 th century Turkish political history. Next, referring to these two noticeable events, the Turkish 20 th century political history was divided into three periods, which we labelled as "foundation", "interim" and "post-1980". Having the three periods split apart, following Beck and Jennings' advice, opportunities for involvement was considered by making the following qualitative assessment. 14 The interim period (which ranges between 1960 and 1980) was distinguished from the foundation and the post-1980 periods owing to relatively lower level of restrictive politico-juridical practices that took place during this period. Following this periodization, in order to clarify generational locations, each respondent was associated with one political period by referring to the year he/she spent his/her formative age in. Our selection of the formative age is guided by some important works in the extant early socialization literature. According to Mannheim the age seventeen or thereabouts is the formative time in a person's life cycle. 15 Nie and his collaborators defined the formative period as an interval between mid to late adolescence. 16 According to Powell and Cowart, this period is between ages twelve and thirty. 17 Erikson suggested the period from fourteen to fifteen for the formation of political views and attitudes. 18 Niemi and Hepburn proposed the age range between fourteen and twenty-five as being crucial for the formation of participatory behaviour. 19 Following this tradition, fifteen was taken as the socialization age. One particular age was preferred to a period in order to avoid overlapping generational locations. Finally, by looking at in which period one spent the fifteenth age, he/she is located in the related generation. The three adjacent generations were thus generated and named after the same names with the political periods. 20 
Social Class
Our social class measurement was derived from the WVS question asking respondents' current or last occupation. Following the question, respondents were given fifteen alternatives to match with their own occupational status. We collapsed 15-digit occupation measurement into a 5-digit social class variable following Erikson and Goldhorpe's class schema, which is a respected categorization of social classes in the capitalist economies. 21 In addition to "manual", "nonmanual" and "service/self-employed" classes, we also included "farmer" and "unemployed" categories due to the high number of respondents who identified themselves as "farmer", "agricultural worker" and "unemployed" while responding the 15-digit survey question.
Besides our variables of primary interest, a series of control variables were also included in the analysis. The configuration of this group of variables was guided by the empirical findings of the previous works. Since education and income variables are expected to intertwine with the social class variable, they were included in the analysis to isolate the pure class effect. 22 The education variable was collapsed into three categories by looking at the three basic stages in the Turkish national education system: elementary, secondary, and university. 23 The income variable was left in its 10-digit original model. Age was employed in its original linear format to control for the age effect. Age squared was included as a quadratic term to account for the curvilinear age effects. Survey year dummies were included to account for the period effect. Including age, age squared and survey year variables allowed to deal to some extent with the age-period-cohort identification problem. 24 Gender was included as a classical control variable. Three more variables, namely political interest, importance of politics and self-political positioning were included to control for the respondents' general interest in politics.
Method
A quantitative approach was employed in this research. Quantitative based methods enable social scientists to study common forms, trends and patterns of behaviours in a more rigorous way. Three groups of logistic regression were employed in the analyses for estimating probabilities for three unconventional repertoires of political action. 25 The reason underlying the selection of logistic regression is the dichotomous character of the dependent variables. Each group of regressions consisted of four models. The first set of models tested the first and second hypotheses, the next two sets of models tested the third hypothesis and the fourth set of models ran three separate analyses with three samples coming from three adjacent generations to test the fourth hypothesis.
FINDINGS
Before we move on with inferential statistics, we hereby represent descriptive findings first. Table 1 demonstrates the percentage shares of "have done" answers given to the petition, boycott and demonstration questions for each generation divided by survey years. Table 1 about here The table provides prima facie evidence supporting our both first and the second hypotheses explaining generational implications of macropolitical effect and macroeconomic socialization effect in different rounds. As shown in the table, until 2007 for petition and boycott and until 2011 for demonstration, the percentage rates of "have done" answers generally start off from a low level, reach a nadir in the middle and level off in the end. This lends support to our second hypothesis which is based on the macropolitical effect over the first one. However, by 2007 for petition and boycott and by 2001 for demonstration, percentage rates increase continuously which supports our first hypothesis which is based on macroeconomic socialization effect over the second one. Yet, in average, it seems that the macropolitical effect, in descriptive terms, prevails over the macroeconomic effect in the Turkish case. The descriptive findings reveal that the members of the interim generation seem to outparticipate the members of the foundation and the post-1980 generations when average rates are considered. However, it should be noted that the trend is changing in the recent rounds. For a more robust analysis, three groups of logistic regression are run for three unconventional repertoires of political action. Table 2 shows the models predicting signing a petition. Table 2 about here The first model tests the first two alternative hypotheses. After introducing all the necessary controls, the coefficient scores and odds rations pertaining to the categories of the generation variable show that there is no significant difference, neither between the post-1980 and the interim generations (p=.190) nor between the post-1980 and the foundation generations (p=.284) with respect to their members' likelihoods of signing a petition. When the reference category is switched to foundation, there is also no significant difference between the foundation and the interim generations (p=.550). The second and the third models test our third hypothesis which was generated in line with Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis. The second model reveals that the members of the nonmanual class are 1.79 times more likely to sign a petition than the members of the manual class (p<.000). However, as shown on the third model, when education and income variables are controlled, the significant difference between the two classes disappears (p=.803). The fourth model, on the other hand, tests Lipset's thesis across three subsequent generations. When the model is run with the data coming from the interim generation, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between the manual and nonmanual categories (p=.252). However, the members of the unemployed category have significantly lower odds of signing a petition than the members of all other classes. Apart from these, there are no statistically significant differences between any class pairs among the remaining four classes. When the same model is run with the data coming from the foundation and the post-1980 generations, no significant difference can be observed between any class pairs except for the difference between unemployed and farmer categories of the foundation generation. Table 3 shows the models predicting joining in a boycott. Table 3 about here
The first model tests the first two alternative hypotheses. It is shown in the table that the post-1980 generation, does not differ with respect to their members' likelihood of joining in a boycott from the foundation and interim generations (p=.292 and .247 respectively). The second model reveals that the members of the nonmanual class are 1.86 times more likely to join in a boycott than the members of the manual class (p< .000). Moreover, as shown on the third model, the significant difference between the classes fades away when the education and income variables are controlled (p=.306). The fourth model runs the same analysis for samples coming from the three subsequent generations. As the table shows no significant difference can be observed between the two classes of primary interest, neither in the foundation nor in the post-1980 generations. However, the analysis of the interim generation surprisingly shows that the members of the manual class have 1.69 times the odds of joining in a boycott than the members of the nonmanual class (p=. 044). Yet, it should be noted that the difference is only marginally significant. In fact, our analysis shows that the manual class members of the interim generation have higher odds of joining in a boycott compared to their counterparts from all the other social classes except for the serv./self-employed class. Table 4 shows the models predicting lawful demonstrations. Table 4 about here The first model shows that the members of the post-1980 generation are significantly less likely to attend lawful demonstrations compared to the members of the interim generation (p=.007). It can be seen from the second model that the members of the nonmanual class have 1.79 times higher odds of attending a lawful demonstration than the members of the manual class (p< .017) and as shown by the third model the difference becomes insignificant when the education and income are controlled (p=.053). The fourth model reveals that the odds of attending in a lawful demonstration do not appear to be significantly different for any of the two classes in the foundation and the post-1980 generations. However, in the interim generation the members of the manual class seem to be more likely to attend lawful demonstrations compared to their unemployed, farmer and serv./self-employed counterparts (p=.027, .027, .037 respectively). Nevertheless, the difference between the manual and the nonmanual classes is still insignificant (p=.190) .
CONCLUSION
The present research has aimed to investigate the generational and social class bases of political activism in Turkey. Our first and the second hypotheses basically suggested that the post-1980 and interim generations are different from each other with respect to their likelihoods of participating in the three unconventional repertoires of political action. More specifically, we argued that if Inglehart's macroeconomic socialization thesis is applicable to the Turkish case, the post-1980 generation should be more activity-prone than the interim generation. Alternatively, we suggested that if Beck and Jennings' macropolitical effect has generational implications for political activism in Turkey, the interim generation should be more activityprone than the post-1980 generation. Neither our first nor second hypotheses concerning the relationship between generation and political activism are confirmed for two out of three unconventional repertoires of political action. For demonstration only we achieved limited evidence favouring the Hypothesis II over the Hypothesis I. In other words, neither Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis is applicable to nor Beck and Jennings' macropolitical effect has generational implications for the Turkish case. This finding has a bearing on the current "rising participatory Gezi generation" discussions. At least for what concerns our analyses, we do not find evidence for this pattern in our data. There might be several reasons underlying this. The first explanation coming to mind is that the macroeconomic and macropolitical effects might have counterbalanced each other in socializing potential generations. Our descriptive findings shown in the Table 1 supported this idea. An alternative explanation could be that, the Gezi generation is still too young to appear in our results. Each explanation requires further scrutiny and presents avenues for further research. Yet, even though the ESS data asking respondents' participation in the last 12 months also reveal generational patterns similar to what we have found, 26 if there were significant differences between the generations, there would not be any way of knowing with data in hand, except making predictions in accordance with theories, whether socialization mechanism or period effect was primarily responsible of this difference, owing to the fact that the WVS question does not reveal the exact date that the activity took place.
Our third hypothesis was designed as a test of Lipset's working class authoritarianism thesis. We hypothesized in line with Lipset's thesis that the members of the working class are less likely to participate in politics than the members of the middle class and this is largely due to the former group's low education and to a lesser extent low income. The analysis run with the pooled data coming from all the generations validated Lipset's thesis to a large extent. It was shown that for participating in all the three unconventional repertoires of political action, the members of the nonmanual class outstripped the members of the manual class and the differences between the two classes disappeared when the education and income variables were controlled. However, the whole picture changed when the generation factor was taken into account. Our fourth group of analysis showed that although it does not play a direct one, generation plays an indirect role in political activism operating via social class structure. We found that for all the three unconventional repertoires of action, the total number of significant differences in the interim generation (which is ten) is higher than the total number of significant differences in the foundation (which is one) and post-1980 (which is zero) generations. 27 This finding supports our fourth hypothesis suggesting that for those generations, which have come of age under an authoritarian politico-juridical order, the social classes are equalized with respect to their members' level of political activity. Yet, the most interesting is the finding related to the analysis of the interim generation, for which we expected Lipset's thesis to hold true due to its members' non-exposure to system-level authoritarianism. Surprisingly, our finding run explicitly counter to Lipset's prediction. We found that, in the interim generation the manual class is not less activityprone than the nonmanual class. By looking at this picture, we can conclude that Lipset's thesis is not invalid only for those generations which were socialized by system-level authoritarianism but also for those which were not. Moreover, for all the three forms of action in the interim generation, the total number of inter-class differences between the manual class and the two low classes (which is four) was greater than the total number of inter-class differences between the manual class and the two high classes (which is two). In other words, the manual class resembles to the two high classes with a greater degree than it resembles to the two low classes. By looking at this extra finding, we can conclude that for those generations, which were not exposed to system-level authoritarianism during their formative years, the main clash regarding political activism seems to be between the traditional and modern classes. This suggests a role for modernization effect. This finding also promotes modernization theory's classification of the social classes that was based on traditional/modern dichotomy against Lipset's categorization of the classes which regards manual/working class among the low classes.
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